

Taiwan and China Cross-strait Negotiations: The International Connection

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ABSTRACT

Cross-strait negotiations involve an often-overlooked *international* dimension. Since the international arena caters to Beijing's "One China" policy, more and more Taiwanese people will oppose the policy because it diminishes their country's international status. Therefore, the U.S.-led international community can create a sound, equal basis for negotiations by loosening political restrictions and eliminating PRC coercion on Taiwan with the following: a flexible interpretation of the "One China" policy; Taiwan's participation in international organizations; and military capability to defend itself. The Bush administration should encourage cross-strait negotiations based on parity and preserve Taiwan's democracy and freedoms.

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I. INTRODUCTION

During his presidential campaign, U.S. President George W. Bush emphasized the strategic importance of Europe and Asia in framing U.S. foreign policy. His emphasis reflects the challenges from Eurasia's two biggest powers in transition - China and Russia - to the U.S. as a superpower. If both countries choose to be friends with the United States, then that friendship will stabilize the world. But if not, global peace may be in jeopardy. Therefore, President Bush must endeavor with allies in Europe and Asia to preserve world peace and stability by meeting these challenges from China and Russia.¹

President Bush does not view China as positively as had Bill Clinton, calling it a "strategic competitor" rather than a "strategic partner" in response to China's military buildup and religious and human rights violations. This tactical shift has led to the strengthening of security ties with U.S. allies in Asia and the future development and deployment of missile defense systems, which are aimed at countering threats from rogue states as well as from China. The Bush administration has also deepened the U.S. commitment to Taiwan's national defense, asserting that it is in the *interest* of the U.S. to do so, not merely an obligation to a long-time ally.²

Asia contains over 53 percent of the world's population, accounts for approximately 25 percent of the world's economic growth, and yields \$600 billion in annual trade with the United States.³ Washington recognizes Asia's importance to American prosperity. The new U.S. strategy for security in the Asia-Pacific region is the following:

1. The United States will maintain its superpower status, continuing to exercise its influence over Asia. Washington will deter further escalation of tensions in the following four areas in Asia: the Taiwan Strait, the Korean peninsula, India and Pakistan, and Indonesia's East Timor. The United States will deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote democracy in Asia.
2. The United States will strengthen relations with its allies in Asia. Currently, the U.S. has mutual security alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia. The U.S. will not allow other countries, such as China, to disrupt relations with its allies. Washington will maintain military bases in Asia. The U.S. must strengthen its relations with Japan, which is central to the U.S. strategy to develop a security apparatus in Asia. Japan has spent \$5 billion annually to maintain U.S. military bases. The maintenance of U.S. military bases in Japan, which enables the U.S. to respond swiftly to potential crises in Asia, is thus a key issue in U.S.-Japan relations. In addition, the United States wants to strengthen security ties with Australia and South Korea as a counter to growing Chinese military power.⁴
3. The United States will strengthen its relations with the European Union (EU), and hopes that the inclusion of more European countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will enable the U.S. to resolve, if not prevent, potential crises in Europe. Already facing a Chinese challenge, the U.S. does not want to be engulfed in two regional wars simultaneously, whether they are in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, or the Middle East.

4. The U.S. will also work closely with India, which is now at a crossroads concerning its proper direction, and encourage it to develop stability and security in Asia. China continues to export nuclear equipment and technology to Pakistan and Iran, and has contributed to Pakistan's nuclear tests. India's large population and military is of strategic importance. The U.S. must strengthen its relations with India, not only to prevent an India-Pakistan military conflict but also to counterbalance China's military challenge.

While the People's Republic of China emerges as the leading power in Asia, it will inevitably become the greatest challenge for the United States. The U.S. must recognize China's potential threat that is based on the following factors: Chinese sales of nuclear weapons technology to other countries; the PRC's build-up of short-range ballistic missiles across from Taiwan in recent years; 17.7 percent increase in its defense budget in 2001; development of intercontinental ballistic missiles which would enable nuclear strikes on the U.S. West Coast; a questionable human rights record; and its more than \$60 billion trade surplus with the United States.

Due to the increasing Chinese threat, the U.S. recently reassessed Taiwan's strategic role and came to different conclusions. In a possible scenario whereby China would forcibly seize Taiwan, the U.S. must be able to respond effectively, or else lose the trust of Japan and South Korea, and also undermine its relations with other Asian allies and its preeminence in Asia. On the other hand, were the U.S. to prevent war between China and Taiwan and to advocate a peaceful settlement of cross-strait relations, then the U.S. could maintain broader peace and stability in East Asia, which, in turn, would strengthen its leading role. The Bush administration will be judged according to how it maintains a cross-strait military balance, persuades China not to use military means against Taiwan, and encourages both sides of the Taiwan Strait to resume dialogue.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL CONNECTION TO CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

The future development of cross-strait relations is not merely a problem that concerns only Beijing and Taipei, but rather consists of international-related factors that can also influence that development. In its February 2000 White Paper on "The One-China Principle And The Taiwan Problem," China stated that the reason why the Taiwan question has not been settled for such a long period of time is mainly due to the intervention of foreign forces and the obstruction of separatist forces in Taiwan. China also added the threat that if foreign countries invade and occupy Taiwan, or the Taiwan authorities refuse the peaceful settlement of cross-strait reunification through negotiations, then Beijing may adopt all possible drastic measures, including the use of force; to fulfill the great cause of reunification.⁵ China has repeatedly opposed foreign interference in the Taiwan problem. Paradoxically, however, China has mobilized efforts to elicit foreign interference, in hopes of further isolating Taiwan internationally, oppressing Taiwan's leverage in cross-strait negotiations, and forcing Taiwan to accept the "One Country, Two Systems" formula.

The future negotiations of cross-strait relations can be divided into two sides: the international side and the cross-strait side. If either China or Taiwan garners more support from the international community, then it will obtain more leverage in cross-strait negotiations. Otherwise, it will lose ground. Beijing has recently taken the following measures to gain foreign support in regard to the Taiwan question:

1. To contribute to the "Three No's" ripple effect: After President Clinton publicly declared his Three No's at Shanghai in June 1998, China extensively tried to elicit foreign support in efforts to send a Three No's ripple effect throughout every country. With the exception of Russia which supported the Three No's, all other countries - most significantly, Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom, and France - have refused to follow the U.S. in acknowledging the Three No's.⁶
2. To carry out the "Three Emptiness" policy: Beijing intends to completely eliminate all of Taiwan's allies, hinder Taiwan's path toward international recognition, and to constrict Taiwan's leverage in negotiations. Since 1998 Beijing has stripped Taiwan of five allies -- South Africa, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Tonga and Macedonia. China assiduously promotes and carries out its "Three Emptiness" policy, which has not yet abated.
3. To promote "Great Powers Diplomacy" and create a multipolar international arena: In the past few years, China has frequently sent its party, state, and military leaders to visit Russia, the United States, ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. China has established different cooperative partnerships with those countries. China hopes that these countries not only support "One China," "One Country, Two Systems" and "Three No's," but also China seeks to undermine U.S. hegemony. China hopes even more that the West will help to further develop its economy, through which China can strengthen its military and political powers.

Although it may seem that Beijing opposes turning the Taiwan question into a key international issue, China is actually seeking support from the international community to consider the Taiwan issue as its own political, internal affair. In its White Paper, China smugly indicated that there are currently 161 countries that have diplomatic relations with China, have acknowledged the one-China principle, and have promised to handle their relations with Taiwan within the one-China principle. Beijing aspires to use the internationally-accepted one-China framework to be the foundation for cross-strait negotiations. Therefore, the international dimension of cross-strait relations must not be neglected.

China's security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region for the 21st century is the following:

1. China seeks to end U.S. hegemonic influence. Beijing's strategy in Europe is for the European Union and Russia to constrain and overpower the United States. China's strategy in Asia is likewise to sow discord within U.S.-Japan relations, U.S.-South Korea relations, and other U.S. alliances, thereby undermining U.S. hegemonic

influence. Furthermore, China will strengthen its ties with ASEAN, with which it will oppose the U.S. campaign to impose its version of human rights on Asian countries. Beijing attempts to utilize "Great Powers Diplomacy" to gain leverage in its negotiations with the U.S. It also hopes that the creation of a multi-polar world will cause the U.S. to lose its hegemonic posture and thus become only one of many great powers.

2. China's policy toward the U.S. is twofold. On the one hand, China actively tries to acquire U.S. high technology and top-secret military and weapons information, and to accumulate huge foreign reserves in its trade surplus with the U.S. in order to boost its own economy. On the other hand, China also seeks a confrontational strategy with the United States. China exports nuclear weapons related technology and equipment, strengthens its military power, modernizes its equipment, attempts to deter U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and hopes that the U.S. will facilitate its efforts to achieve "One China," "One Country, Two Systems" and Chinese reunification.
3. In the aftermath of the political fall of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and the demise of the former Soviet Union, Chinese leaders have refrained from further political reform, such as liberalization and democratization. To reduce international pressure on Beijing to undertake political reform, Beijing has nurtured fervent Chinese nationalism. Beijing has urged its citizens to focus on economic prosperity, yet has also increased its spying and oppression, forcing its citizens into submission, in order to maintain political stability.
4. China opposes the American deployment of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system in the U.S. and the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system in Asia, which could include Taiwan. American public opinion differs, for some Americans believe that NMD and TMD can be utilized as a bargaining chip in U.S.-China negotiations to limit Chinese nuclear weapons proliferation, and Chinese missile threats towards Taiwan, or to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles, thereby reducing the threat to U.S. national defense. China is expected, however, to continue research and development of intercontinental ballistic missiles both in quality and quantity no matter what the U.S. does. As the world recognizes China's status as an emerging superpower, China will gain internal political stability and leverage in cross-strait negotiations.

After the U.S. accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in May 1999, Beijing incited nationalist sentiments against the U.S. and its democracy. The Chinese leadership will utilize its people's anti-American resentments as a bargaining chip in U.S.-China negotiations in the future. However, if China continues to cultivate anti-Americanism, to widen the gap between China and the U.S., or to make any further divisive decisions regarding its policy toward the U.S., then U.S.-China relations will lead to an uncertain future.

China reiterates that the Taiwan problem is the major impediment in U.S.-China relations. Yet the resolution of the Taiwan problem will not guarantee smooth development of U.S.-China relations. If China uses force to resolve the Taiwan problem, then at the appointed time it will attempt to undermine U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific region.

III. THE MAIN FACTOR BEHIND THE CROSS-STRAIT IMPASSE: UNEQUAL BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS

The international community has continuously hoped for resumption of cross-strait dialogue, peaceful resolution of the differing opinions, and maintenance of cross-strait peace and East Asian stability. As leader of the international community, the U.S. has closely monitored Beijing and Taipei policy changes, but appears unaware of its own intimate connection to cross-strait negotiations.

The current cross-strait impasse is actually due to the restrictions imposed on Taiwan by the "One China" principle, which constricts Taiwan's living space in the international arena and foreign arms sales to Taiwan, and threatens to use force against the island. Since the "One China" principle is widely recognized by the international community, China is adamant that Beijing constitutes the central government of China, while Taipei is merely one of its local governments. However, the Republic of China government in accordance with Taiwanese public opinion will not accept the "One China, Two Systems" model and thereby relinquish its sovereignty, nor will it become a special administrative region of the People's Republic of China. The unequal basis for cross-strait negotiations is also because the international community caters to Beijing's suppression of Taipei's international living space. Beijing has always adopted a "zero-sum" attitude toward Taipei's international status: Taiwan cannot participate in international governmental organizations; it cannot buy arms from foreign countries; and Taiwan cannot delay cross-strait negotiations. Beijing perceives that Taiwan is creating "One China, One Taiwan" or "Two Chinas," which gives Beijing justification to use military force against Taiwan. Although many countries may sympathize with Taiwan, the political reality that China is globally more important than Taiwan has resulted in wide support for China's One China principle.

It is unrealistic to assume that the international community can expect cross-strait negotiations to bear fruit without altering current unequal posturing. In order to make a favorable turn from the current impasse in cross-strait negotiations, the international community should acknowledge the following:

1. Cross-strait negotiations have two sides -- an international side as well as a cross-strait side. An alteration on the international side will directly affect cross-strait dialogue and negotiations.
2. Since the international community caters to China's unyielding interpretation of "One China," Beijing believes it is justified to threaten Taiwan with arms. In addition, China will not take the initiative to express goodwill toward Taiwan or positively promote cross-strait dialogue.
3. Since the international arena caters to Beijing's "One China" policy, more and more Taiwanese people will oppose Beijing's "One China" policy, causing Beijing and Taipei to fall into another impasse in cross-strait negotiations.
4. If the international community hopes for the resumption of cross-strait dialogue, then it must adjust its current views in order to end the cross-strait impasse. The international community must allow a flexible interpretation of the "One China"

principle; reduce the current inequality gap in cross-strait negotiations, allows Taiwan to participate in international organizations on an equal footing, to maintain necessary military capability to defend itself, and to preclude cross-strait negotiations to be conducted under fear or pressure.

5. If the international community allows a flexible interpretation of the "One China" principle, then the number of Taiwanese people who oppose the "One China" principle will decrease, which will help improve cross-strait relations. Under this new international political reality, China will have to adjust its zero-sum attitude toward Taiwan.
6. In short, the international community should somehow make it clear to Beijing that recognition of the PRC is not tantamount to a blanket, inflexible acceptance of Beijing's One China principle.

IV. NEW THINKING TO HANDLE CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

In his first public speech on March 31, 2000 after Taiwan's presidential elections, Raymond F. Burghardt, Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), presented the following six principles of U.S. policy toward the cross-strait relations:

1. The U.S. is committed to its one-China policy as defined by the three communiqués.
2. The U.S. insists that the Taiwan-Strait issue must be resolved peacefully.
3. The U.S. is confident that the two sides have the creativity to resolve the issue on their own without U.S. mediation.
4. The U.S. refuses to pressure either side to accept any arrangements it does not believe are in its interests.
5. The U.S. understands that any arrangements reached between Beijing and Taipei should be mutually acceptable and not imposed by one side on the other.
6. The U.S. understands that Taiwan is a politically democratic entity and that all arrangements between the two sides must be acceptable to the Taiwan public.⁷

AIT Director Raymond F. Burghardt reiterated that the U.S.'s cross-strait policy is built on three principles: first, the U.S. supports a one-China policy as defined by the Taiwan Relations Act and the three communiqués; second, the Taiwan-Strait issue should be resolved peacefully; and third, the U.S. believes that dialogue is the best way to resolve the differences.⁸

The United States cross-strait policy has been based on the following four pillars: one China, cross-strait dialogue, peaceful resolution, and consent of the people of Taiwan. Nevertheless, the international community should create new ideas in order to resume cross-strait dialogue and new opportunities that would resolve the impasse. The following suggestions are presented:

1. An Innovative "One China" Policy Contains a Premise and Flexibility

In order to encourage China to use peaceful methods to resolve the cross-strait disputes, the U.S.-led international community should continually remind the leaders in Beijing that the "One China" policy has a premise, a condition and a basis.

In an interview with the National Broadcast Company on March 10, 1996, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said, "We have always abided by the One China policy. However, this policy is conditioned upon China's promise to use a peaceful method to resolve the Taiwan problem and not with the use of force."⁹ Christopher said that Chinese military exercises had jeopardized the U.S. "One China" policy.¹⁰ In his speech concerning "U.S. Interests and U.S.-China Relations," given on May 17, 1996, Christopher reiterated that "our 'One China' policy is predicated on the PRC's pursuit of a peaceful resolution of issues between Taipei and Beijing."¹¹ The U.S. insists that the resolution of the Taiwan problem between the PRC and Taiwan must be peaceful.

Secretary of State Christopher's speech has the following purposes: (1) to give hint to the PRC that if it uses armed force against Taiwan, then the "One China" policy which has been acknowledged by the U.S. for the past 20 years may be changed; and (2) although the U.S. continues to support the "One China" policy, this policy is based on the PRC's pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem. The U.S. will officially connect the "One China" policy with a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem.

The platform of the 2000 Republican Party convention also stated that the U.S. acknowledges the "One China" principle, the premise of which is that China cannot use armed force to deal with Taiwan. If the U.S.-led international community can in the future remind the PRC that the "One China" policy has a premise and a condition, then this would encourage leaders in Beijing to realize the adverse consequences of an armed attack on Taiwan, and to adopt a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Furthermore, the August 17, 1992 Communiqué also has a premise, which was the Chinese promise to resolve peacefully the Taiwan issue. However, China continues to threaten Taiwan with military attack in defiance of its previous pledge.

Since becoming president in May 2000, Chen Shui-bian has expressed his hope that cross-strait dialogue can quickly resume, so that both sides can jointly resolve the "One China" issue. Qian Qichen once said, "China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division" and "Both the mainland and Taiwan are part of China." If the international community is able to actively and continuously encourage Beijing to have a flexible interpretation of the "One China" policy in its domestic and foreign affairs, then cross-strait problems can be peacefully resolved. However, the real key is dependent on whether the U.S.-dominated international community can take the lead to have a flexible interpretation of "One China," enabling both the mainland and Taiwan to inhabit an international living space based on parity.

In the past, the U.S. added modifiers to its One China policy, such as "our one China policy" and "the one China policy we have agreed on." The U.S. purposely differentiates its One China policy with either that of China or Taiwan in order to maneuver.

Since the beginning of the year 2000, the U.S. has laid out more clearly the parameters of its One China policy. AIT Director Raymond F. Burghardt stated in a speech given on May 29, 2000 that the U.S. supports a one-China policy as defined by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués. In fact, the U.S. recognized the Republic of China in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, but then recognized the People's Republic of China in the U.S.-China Normalization Communiqué of 1979. Therefore, the "One China" as defined by the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués is ambiguous. Furthermore, since "One China" is defined by the TRA, the U.S. government should make the TRA the cornerstone of its policy and support Taiwan's participation in international organizations. The Taiwan Relations Act, Section 4(d), states that nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.

If the international community can have a flexible interpretation of "One China" to allow Taipei and Beijing to coexist and to maintain their reputation in the international community, then this will reduce the Taiwanese people's skepticism towards "One China" and to let Taipei engage in negotiations with Beijing on an equal footing. As a result, the cross-strait impasse will gradually transform into opportunities to improve cross-strait relations.

2. A New Dimension to Cross-Strait Dialogue: Open-Ended Agenda and Negotiations on an Equal Footing

The international community hopes that both sides resolve their differences. In addition, the U.S. reiterates its hope that cross-strait negotiations will quickly resume. Therefore, the U.S.-led international community should create an open-ended, flexible agenda, instead of following Beijing's efforts to deny Taiwan its international living space. In his "Three No's" remark in 1998, President Clinton undermined the Taiwanese people's high aspirations for Taipei's participation in international organizations, expressly contrary to the TRA. However AIT Director Richard Bush drew a linguistic distinction in the "Three No's" between "do not support" and "oppose." Therefore, Washington does not have to repeat its "Three No's," and should let the two sides to resolve their differences on certain matters, such as Taipei's participation in international organizations. Otherwise, China can utilize the internationally-supported "Three No's" to refuse to negotiate with Taiwan on the matter of Taipei's participation in international organizations. This in turn could result in smaller prospects for an open-ended agenda and negotiations on an equal footing. Taipei would then be in an unfavorable situation, which would make Beijing more unyielding in its demands, and cross-strait negotiations would fall into stalemate. The Bush administration has realized the negative impact of the Three No's policy and has taken a position of not to reaffirm President Clinton's Three No's pledge.

U.S. President John F. Kennedy once said, "We never fear negotiation, but we never negotiate in fear." It is not that Taipei fears negotiation. But if the international community follows Beijing in refusing Taipei an equal footing in cross-strait negotiations, then the current cross-strait impasse will continue.

Furthermore, we must realize that history indicates that peace agreements reached by conflicting parties do not guarantee peace among themselves. A year after the Paris Agreement between North and South Vietnam in 1974, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed the following:

“No settlement is self-enforcing. It is not possible to write an agreement whose terms, in themselves, guarantee its performance. Any agreement will last if the hostility of the parties is thereby lessened, if the parties have an incentive to observe it, and/or if the parties pay a penalty for breaking it. If those three conditions are not met, no matter what the terms of the agreement, there is a tendency toward erosion.”¹²

The Paris Peace Accords of 1973 resulted from strenuous negotiations. However in 1975 North Vietnam ultimately chose military attack on the South to achieve the reunification of Vietnam, and thus reneged on the peace agreements.

Currently, the international community is paying close attention to the effectiveness of cross-strait dialogue and negotiations to reach agreements, which would thereby create a peaceful environment in the future. However we must realize that reaching agreements does not end negotiations, if peaceful agreements were to fall through, then it would depend on the international community to continue to provide encouragement and supervision in regard to the cross-strait issue.

3. New Requirements for Peaceful Resolution of Differences: Remind China of Negative Consequences And Maintain A Military Balance across the Taiwan Strait

In order for the U.S.-led international community to secure peace in the Taiwan Strait, it must not only maintain a military balance, but also make Beijing realize that should its military threats to Taiwan continue, then Beijing will face serious consequences. In the aftermath of the Taiwan-Strait Crisis of 1996, President Clinton invited Jiang Zemin to Washington, visited the mainland and gave his "Three No's" promise, all of which sent wrong signals to Beijing, such as encouraging Beijing to continue threatening Taiwan. The Bush administration should avoid Clinton's earlier mistakes, enhance Taiwan's security, and continually remind Beijing that "One China" principle and the "August 17 Communiqué" are predicated on a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Furthermore, the strengthening of the U.S. and Taiwan's defense against potential crises is critical to the maintenance of peace across the Taiwan Strait.

In order to encourage China to pursue a peaceful, equal method to handle the Taiwan issue, the U.S.-led international community must foster a military balance across the Taiwan Strait, thus discouraging Beijing from attacking Taiwan. In addition, if the international community can allow Beijing to understand policy-making, and Beijing continuously escalates its missile threats, then threatened countries will surely search for all possible ways to defend themselves. Over the past years, China continually threatened Taiwan with armed attack, further adding credibility to the China Threat theory. Moreover,

the U.S. is initiating the deployment of the National Missile Defense and Theater Missile Defense systems, providing arms to Taiwan, and negotiating with Asian allies to strengthen security ties -- all measures aimed at responding to a potential crisis in the Asia-Pacific region. If China can realize the negative consequences, be more open-minded, and allow negotiations based on parity, then the U.S.-led international community will look forward a less suspicious and antagonistic relationship with China.

V. CONCLUSION

As the world enters a new century, the greatest challenge facing the U.S. will come from the People's Republic of China. A major test facing the Bush administration is to successfully ward off this challenge. The U.S. will lose its leadership position in Asia if China annexes Taiwan. On the other hand, if the U.S. can lead other democratic countries to encourage both sides to achieve a more equal basis for cross-strait negotiations to break the impasse, promote a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and lead China toward liberalization and democracy, then the U.S. leadership position will be secured.

On November 19, 1999, Texas Governor George W. Bush pointed out that in the dark days of 1941, there were about a dozen democratic countries on the planet, whereas in the 21st century, there are now nearly 120 democracies.¹³ Bush quoted Edmund Burke, an English political philosopher in the eighteenth century: "Depend on it," "The lovers of freedom will be free."¹⁴ To propel China's political revolution toward democracy the following must be done: the U.S.-led international community should not merely hope for peaceful cross-strait negotiations and for Beijing to embrace democracy, but rather actively promote cross-strait negotiations to be conducted on an equal footing; and allow the Taiwanese people who are standing on the "right side of history" to maintain their freedoms and democratic political systems.

FOOTNOTES

1. George W. Bush, "Distinctly American Internationalism," Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999, p. 4.
2. *Ibid.*
3. "The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership," *Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Special Report*, October 11, 2000, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University), p.1.
4. David Lague, "U.S. Security Shake-Up in Asia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 30, 2001, p. 16.
5. "China's White Paper", February 21, 2000, <http://www.fapa.org/update/chinawp/chinawhitepaperenglish.html>, p. 8.
6. President Clinton promised: (1) not to support Taiwan's independence; (2) not to support Two Chinas or One China, One Taiwan; and (3) not to support Taiwan's membership in an international organization based on statehood.
7. "Remarks by Director Raymond F. Burghardt, American Institute in Taiwan to the Annual Meeting of the Society for Strategic Studies," March 31, 2000, Taipei, p. 4.

8. Raymond F. Burghardt, "U.S.-PRC-Taiwan Relations,@ Remarks to the 29th Sino-American Conference on Contemporary China," May 29, 2000, Taipei, *AIT Text File*, BG-2000-12, June 7, 2000, p.3.
9. *United Evening News*, March 31, 1996, p.1; *China Times Evening News*, March 31, 1996, p.1.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Warren Christopher, "American Interests and the U.S.-China Relations," addressed to the Asia Society, the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York, May 17, 1996, *AIT Policy File*, BG-1996-15, May 24, 1996, p.3.
12. Allan E. Goodman, *The Lost Peace* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 165.
13. George W. Bush, "Distinctly American Internationalism," Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999, p. 2.
14. *Ibid.*